Appeals Court Affirms Decision in Price Discrimination Case

Last year, in Audi of Smithtown Inc. v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Justice Emily Pines of the Suffolk County Supreme Court issued the first decision addressing the price discrimination provisions of New York's Dealer Act.  (Justice Pines' decision may be found here).  The Court found that two Audi incentive programs violated the Dealer Act.   (My prior posts on this decision may be found here and here).   On November 15, 2012,  the Appellate Division: Second Department affirmed Justice Pines' decision in its entirety.  (The Second Department's decision may be found here).  The plaintiffs were represented in this case by this author.

The Second Department agreed with Justice Pines that the two Audi incentive programs at issue violated the New York Dealer Act's prohibition against price discrimination.  Under the two programs at issue, the Keep-it-Audi Program and the CPO Purchase Bonus Program, a dealer earned incentives based on the number of off-lease returns purchased by that dealer.  For qualifying dealers, the Keep-it-Audi Program offered preferential pricing on off-lease purchases and the CPO Purchase Bonus Program offered preferential pricing on purchases of new vehicles.

The crux of this case was that new Audi dealers automatically received the lowest prices on off-lease purchases that existing dealers were rarely, if ever, able to earn.  The existing dealers further argued that this resulted in them having higher costs to earn the bonus on new vehicles.   The Dealer Act broadly prohibits price discrimination but contains a safe harbor for incentive programs that affect price, so long as they are available to all dealers "on a proportionately equal basis."

Several of the Second Department's findings deserve particular attention.  First, that the Dealer Act's price discrimination statute covered not only Audi’s sales of new vehicles to its dealers, but also sales of off-lease vehicles by Audi's captive finance source, Audi Financial Services.  Second, that a vehicle's price can be affected by both up-front discounts and post-sale rebates.  Third, an incentive program affecting price will violate the Dealer Act if certain dealers must incur disproportionately higher costs to earn the benefits of the program.

In keeping with its regulatory and remedial purpose, the Second Department interpreted the Dealer Act’s two-tier pricing provisions broadly,  which may call into question the legality of many rebate-based incentive programs.  For example, incentive programs tied to facility upgrades could be deemed to violate the Dealer Act if a dealer is unable to meet the standard for reasons outside of its control (i.e. zoning) or if certain dealers are subject to disproportionally more expense to qualify (i.e. price of real estate).  Such programs could be held to not be available to all dealers on a proportionately equal basis, which would take them outside of the statutory safe harbor.

Post-Dealer Arbitration Act Litigation Nearing An End

In the aftermath of the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, Congress enacted section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 (“Dealer Arbitration Act”), which created an arbitration process by which Chrysler dealers could challenge their rejection and GM dealers could challenge their being wound down. Under the Dealer Arbitration Act, a successful dealer could obtain the following relief: “continuation, or reinstatement of a franchise agreement, or to be added as a franchisee to the dealer network of the covered manufacturer in the geographical area where the covered dealership was located when its franchise agreement was terminated, not assigned, not renewed, or not continued.” In other words, a successful dealer could be continued, reinstated, or added. In such event, the manufacturer was required to “provide the dealer a customary and usual letter of intent to enter into a sales and service agreement.”

Now, disfavored dealers were treated differently in the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies. In the Chrysler bankruptcy, the franchise agreements of disfavored dealers were formally “rejected” under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. On the other hand, in the GM bankruptcy, the franchise agreements of disfavored dealers were actually assumed, but subject to wind-down agreements executed during the bankruptcy. Under these wind-down agreements, GM’s disfavored dealers received a modest payment and were given time to sell off their remaining inventory and close down operations in an orderly manner. In other words, rejected Chrysler dealers were left behind in the bankruptcy whereas GM’s wind-down dealers continued on post-bankruptcy for a time with so-called New GM. That difference – outright rejection in the Chrysler bankruptcy versus assumption and wind-down in the GM bankruptcy - would prove critical in the arbitration process to come.

Following the arbitrations, successful rejected Chrysler dealers were presented with letters of intent that many of them argued violated the Dealer Arbitration Act because they did not simply reinstate those dealers but rather imposed all sorts of conditions and limitations, such as facility upgrades. In addition, a conundrum was created in instances where New Chrysler had inserted a new dealer into the territory previously assigned to the rejected dealer and that new dealer had territorial rights under their state’s automobile franchise act.

Several lawsuits were commenced around the country and the consistent result was that, although GM’s wind-down dealers could be “continued” or “reinstated,” rejected Chrysler dealers could only be “added.” This is because wind-down GM dealers were operating under existing franchise agreements with New GM, whereas rejected Chrysler dealers had no legal relationship with New Chrysler. Thus, they could only be “added” to New Chrysler’s dealer network and all they were entitled to was a “customary and usual letter of intent to enter into” a franchise agreement. From this ruling, courts also consistently held that the Dealer Arbitration Act did not pre-empt state automobile franchise laws, meaning that existing New Chrysler dealers could challenge the addition of a successful rejected dealer under a state dealer act’s relevant market area provision.

These issues are playing out in United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Eagle Auto Mall Corp. v. Chrysler Group LLC, Case No. 10-cv-3875 (Wexler, J.). By order dated December 23, 2011, Judge Wexler held that the plaintiff dealers were only entitled to be “added” to New Chrysler’s subject to “a customary and usual letter of intent.” Judge Wexler “interpreted this to mean that Plaintiffs were entitled to an offer under terms that were usual and customary at the time of the offer, and not those governing Plaintiffs’ pre-bankruptcy dealership agreements.” However, Judge Wexler went on to hold that whether the letters of intent offered by New Chrysler were usual and customary was a question of fact for trial and denied summary judgment. New Chrysler’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.

After close of discovery, New Chrysler again moved for summary judgment, based on the decision of the court in Los Feliz Ford, Inc. v. Chrysler Group LLC, 10-cv-6077 (C.D. Ca. April 9, 2012), which held that no issues of fact existed as to whether the letter of intent at issue there was “customary and usual”. However, by order dated September 28, 2012, Judge Wexler disagreed and adhered once again to his prior holding that issues of fact remained:

…the issue is whether the letters of intent offered to Plaintiffs here were substantially the same as those offered to dealers who were given the opportunity to be added as new franchisees to the dealer network during the same period. The court has reviews the parties submissions and cannot hold, based upon those papers alone, whether such terms were offered to the Plaintiffs here.

Eagle Auto Mall proceeded to a bench trial of December 3, 2012 and is awaiting decision following the submission of post-trial briefs.

Facility Agreements Not Always Enforceable

A New York state court held that written agreements to renovate dealership facilities are not necessarily enforceable.  In Compass Motors, Inc. v. Volkswagen Group of America, 36 Misc.3d 283, 944 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. Orange Co. 2012), Volkwagen and Compass Motors had entered into a Facility Renovation Agreement, which contained a clause stating:

"If Dealer shall...fail to comply timely with any provisions of this Addendum, or if Dealer shall fail to comply with any  of [Volkwagen's] requirements at the Dealer's Premises, then Dealer agrees that regardless of the weight or magnitude of, or reason for, such failure, [Volkswagen] may, at its option, terminate the Dealer Agreement..., and shall be under no obligation to offer to enter into any subsequent Dealer Agreement with Dealer.  Dealer acknowledges that, in that event, [Volkswagen] would have good cause for terminating or failing to renew the Dealer Agreement"

After failing to renovate the facility in accordance with the Agreement, Volkwagen issued Compass a 90-day notice of termination.  The dealer sued claiming, inter alia, that Volkswagen did not have good cause to terminate its franchise under New York's Dealer Act.  Volkswagen moved to dismiss that claim but the Court denied that motion, despite its being undisputed that the dealer had failed to comply with the Agreement.

The dealer argued, among other things, that "the termination was invalid because the requirement that the dealership be renovated was neither reasonable nor necessary and, in any event, was impossible to perform..."  In denying Volkwagen's motion, the Court found that Volkswagen failed to offer any evidence on this issue.  The Court noted that the Dealer Act places the burden of proof on the franchisor to prove that both due cause and good faith exist to terminate a franchise, and Volkswagen failed to do so. 

This holding comes as no surprise.  By its terms, the protections of the Dealer Act govern notwithstanding the terms of the franchise.   A manufacturer cannot, by contract, force a dealer to waive its statutory rights.  Here, despite the rather remarkable clause in the Agreement quoted above, the Court held that Volkswagen failed to meet its burden by relying merely on the terms of the Agreement and the undisputed fact that Compass had failed to comply with those terms.  Rather, Volkswagen still needed to establish due cause and good faith.